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Abstract
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen II erred in finding that there was
no “final agency action”. Part I of this Comment explores the statutory requirements of NEPA
and the APA as well as the law of the various justiciability doctrines. Part I also examines the
impact of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT on the litigation. Part II details the historical
background, procedural posture, facts and findings in the Public Citizen cases. Part III argues
that the D.C. Circuit interpreted final agency action in Public Citizen II too narrowly. Finally,
this Comment concludes that the issues raised in Public Citizen II are justiciable and that any
exemption from NEPA’s EIS requirement favoring the OTR should be expressed by Congress.
THE INJUSTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICIABILITY:
PUBLIC CITIZEN v. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts in the United States, at one time receptive to
environmental litigants in pursuit of policy change,' increasingly
seek to limit such access to the courthouse.2 The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),' and its requirement
that all U.S. federal agencies prepare an environmental impact
statement ("EIS") prior to major decisions affecting the environ-
ment,4 provides the statutory basis for much environmental liti-
gation. However, because the U.S. Congress did not grant a pri-
vate right of action under NEPA, environmentalists must rely on
the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA")5 to provide for a
right to judicial review. 6 By strictly construing the language of
the APA, which calls for "final agency action" prior to judicial
review, U.S. federal courts have limited the claims of environ-
mentalists.7
1. See Bill J. Hays, Standing and Environmental Law: Judicial Policy and the Impact of
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 KAN. L. REv. 997, 998 (1991). The author notes
that" 'the judiciary's long love affair with environmental litigation' may be ending." Id.
(quoting Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 884 (1983)). See generally, Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Liti-
gation and the Burger Court, 96 Htv. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1982) (describing "public law litiga-
tion" as court effectuated governmental policy change through adjudication of individ-
ual rights).
2. Hays, supra note 1, at 998.
3. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(a) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). The NEPA established a policy to promote a lasting harmony be-
tween man and the environment. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
5. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The APA governs agency procedure and provides the mechanism for judicial review of
agency action adversely affecting individuals. Id.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. The APA allows an individual aggrieved by final agency
action to seek redress in the federal courts. Id.
7. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding
plaintiff failed to identify specific "final agency action" in Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's "land withdrawal review program"). The Supreme Court declined jurisdiction
in Lujan stating:
[F]laws in the entire 'program'-consisting principally of the many individual
actions referenced in the complaint, and presumably actions yet to be taken as
well-cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the
APA, simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of
respondent's members.
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In addition to their strict construction of "final agency ac-
tion", the U.S. federal courts have invoked the separation of
powers concept as a bar to environmental litigation, declaring
the claims nonjusticiable.8 Standing,9 ripeness, 10 political ques-
tion" and mootness 12 doctrines each provide the court with a
means to dismiss environmental claims. With respect to environ-
mental litigation, the federal courts narrowly construe their Arti-
cle III jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution. 13
Recently, environmentalists encountered these obstacles in
their action against the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(the "OTR")1 4 to compel preparation of an EIS in connection
with the negotiation and drafting of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") '5 and the Uruguay Round of the
Id. at 893; see also Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting environmentalists' claim due to failure to identify
final agency action).
8. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, - U.S. -. , 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (dis-
missing environmentalist's complaint for lack of standing).
9. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Standing serves to ensure that a
litigant has a sufficient stake in a controversy and is the proper party to obtain judicial
relief. Id.
10. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Ripeness requires
that an actual, present controversy exist so as to prevent premature adjudication of an
abstract disagreement. Id. Ripeness is closely related to the concepts of finality and
exhaustion of remedies. Id. For purposes of this Comment, ripeness is considered only
in terms of its statutory equivalent under the APA which requires final agency action
prior to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
11. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). A political question involves an issue
committed to the executive or legislative branch of government, and therefore, the
courts will refrain from making a judicial determination on the matter rather than en-
croach upon the powers of a coordinate branch. Id. at 208-10.
12. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982). A moot case is one in which the
controversy between the parties ceases to exist or is no longer "live" and judicial deter-
mination would have no practical effect. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
14. The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a) (1988). The OTR is an agency
located within the Executive Office of the President. Id. The OTR serves as the United
States' chief negotiator on trade matters reporting directly to the President and Con-
gress and is responsible for the administration of trade agreements. Id. § (c) (1) (B).
The OTR develops and coordinates United States trade policy, id., and levies trade
sanctions on other countries where necessary. Id. §§ 2411-17. The OTR also has other
responsibilities aside from assisting and advising the President. Id. § 2171. The current
issue stems from the OTR's involvement in negotiating and drafting the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). public Citizen v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
296 (entered into forceJan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See Description of the Proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement; Prepared &y the Governments of Canada, the United Mexi-
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICIABILITY: PUBLIC CITIZEN 1117
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").16 Many en-
vironmentalists in the United States feared that NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round of GATT would have a detrimental effect on the
U.S. environment. 17 With the incorporation of a supplemental
agreement on the environment,1 8 most U.S. environmentalists'
fears regarding NAIFTA were allayed.19 However, some environ-
mentalists in the United States remained concerned and acted
to ensure that all decisions on NAFTA took into account the en-
vironmental impact of the agreement."
In Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive ("Public Citizen 1"),21 U.S. environmentalists brought suit
against the OTR to compel production of an EIS on NAFTA and
can States and the United States of America, Aug. 12, 1992, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA
Database, PR Trade File [hereinafter Description ofNAFTA]. NAFTA is a comprehensive
plan to eliminate tariffs on trade among the member nations - the United States,
Canada and Mexico. NAFTA, supra, art. 101, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
16. Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del Este, GATT DOC. MIN. DEC. No. 86-1572,
Sept. 20, 1986 [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
17. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a
North American Free Trade Agreement, May 1, 1991, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA
Database, PR Trade File [hereinafter Response of the Administration]. Some of the envi-
ronmentalists' fears included: (1) Mexico's poor environmental track record of low or
unenforced environmental quality standards; (2) the flight of United States companies
to Mexico to avoid strict United States standards on environmental quality; and (3) the
diminished vitality of existing United States environmental quality standards due to
NAFTA itself. Id.; see generally Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'don other grounds, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (discussing resulting litigation).
18. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1482 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement]; see NAFTA Supplemental Agree-
ment: North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between The Government of the
United States of America, The Government of Canada and The Government of the United Mexi-
can States, Sept. 13, 1993 (Final Draft), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NAFTA File
(detailing mechanism for environmental enforcement and expressing spirit of coopera-
tion).
19. Keith Schneider, Environmental Groups are Split on. Support for Free Trade Pact,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at Al. Environmental groups supporting NAFTA include
the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Conser-
vation Institute, the Audubon Society, the World Wildlife Fund and the National Wild-
life Federation. Id.; Hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee: NAFTA
and the Environment, FED. NEWS Svc., Mar. 15, 1993, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library
("NAFTA is the greenest trade agreement in history.").
20. See Schneider supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing split on envi-
ronmental support for NAFTA).
21. 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992) "Public Citizen L"
1118 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:1115
the Uruguay Round of GATT. 2 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that plaintiff environmentalists lacked
standing and dismissed the complaint.23 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court de-
cision.24 The D.C. Circuit held that since NAFTA and the Uru-
guay Round of GATT were then in the negotiation and drafting
stage, the OTR's action was not final and thus, not reviewable.
When the OTR submitted the final draft of NAFTA to the
President, Public Citizen reinstated the lawsuit.26 In Public Citi-
zen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative ("Public Citizen
If') ,27 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found
that Public Citizen had satisfied both the APA and justiciability
requirements forjurisdiction. 8 On the merits, the district court
ordered the OTR to produce an EIS.29 On appeal, however, the
D.C. Circuit again held that plaintiffs had failed to identify final
agency action.3 °
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen
H erred in finding that there was no "final agency action". Part I
of this Comment explores the statutory requirements of NEPA
and the APA as well as the law of the various justiciability doc-
trines. Part I also examines the impact of NAFTA and the Uru-
guay Round of GATT on the litigation. Part II details the histori-
cal background, procedural posture, facts and findings in the
Public Citizen cases. Part III argues that the D.C. Circuit inter-
preted final agency action in Public Citizen II too narrowly. Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes that the issues raised in Public
Citizen II are justiciable and that any exemption from NEPA's
22. Id. Plaintiff environmentalists include Public Citizen, the Sierra Club, and
Friends of the Earth (collectively "Public Citizen"). Public Citizen 1, 782 F. Supp. at 141.
23. Id. at 144. The district court also noted a finality problem in the environmen-
talists' claim. Id. at 142 n.2.
24. Public Citizen 1, 970 F.2d at 917. The D.C. Circuit, without reaching the stand-
ing issue, held that the claim was not judicially reviewable in the absence of final agency
action. Id.
25. Id. at 919.
26. Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp.
21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994).
27. 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, -
U.S. - ,114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) "Public Citizen I".
28. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 30.
29. Id.
30. Public Citizen I 5 F.3d at 550.
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EIS requirement favoring the OTR should be expressed by Con-
gress.
I. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED IN
THE PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION AND THE LINK
BETWEEN TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Although U.S. federal law requires agencies engaging in ma-
jor activity with a significant effect on the environment to pre-
pare an EIS, 1 a private litigant that asks a court to compel prep-
aration of an EIS by a federal agency must overcome both statu-
tory3" and judicial3 3 obstacles. The APA prevents private litigants
from challenging any agency action that is not final.3 4 In addi-
tion, the doctrines of justiciability require plaintiffs to show that
an issue is properly before a U.S. federal court.35 Recently, the
U.S. federal courts addressed these jurisdictional matters in the
context of litigation linking trade and the environment.3 6
A. Statutes Implicated in the Public Citizen Litigation
While NEPA provides a basis for environmental litigation in
the United States,3 7 the statute's use is limited by the absence of
a private right of action.3 8 A private environmental group chal-
lenging a proposal for legislation or major federal action must,
therefore, be adversely affected by final agency action under the
APA in order to pursue a cause of action.3 9 In the absence of
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
33. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing justiciability doctrines
and cases applying).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 704. What constitutes finality for purposes of the APA has been the
focus of recent litigation in the U.S. federal courts. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts,
- U.S. -_, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (interpreting "final agency action"); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (analyzing "final agency action"); Public Citizen
II, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying Franklin standard).
35. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (analyzing
plaintiff environmentalists' standing). See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing justiciability doctrines and cases applying).
36. Public Citizen , 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549
(D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
38. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882; Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d
at 551 (discussing absence of private right of action under NEPA).
39. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
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APA "finality", the U.S. federal courts are without jurisdiction.4"
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
In 1969, the U.S. Congress passed a comprehensive -set of
environmental laws known as the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA") .41 The purpose of the enactment of NEPA was:
(1) to encourage harmony between man and the environment;
(2) to prevent or eliminate environmental damage and stimulate
human health and welfare; (3) to improve the nation's under-
standing of ecological systems and natural resources; and (4) to
create a Council on Environmental Quality.42 As one commen-
tator noted, NEPA marked a new era in environmental protec-
tion.4 a
To achieve NEPA's goals, the U.S. Congress declared that it
was the federal government's continuing policy "to use all practi-
cable means" to establish conditions that would foster harmony
between man and nature for the benefit of present and future
Americans. 44 Congress indicated that the laws of the United
States were to be interpreted and administered according to the
policies set out in the Act.45 Congress also directed all agencies
of the U.S. federal government to reform their decision making
process and to include, with legislative proposals or other major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment, a detailed EIS.46 Thus, NEPA allowed judicial review of
40. Id.
41. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(a) (1988
& Supp. IV).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. NEPA was designed
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the nation; and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality.
Id.
43. Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litiga-
tion, 81 CAL. L. REv. 929, 979 (1993). In criticizing some courts for refusing to consider
evidence not previously submitted to an agency in NEPA actions, the author noted that
"[b]eginning with the enactment of NEPA, Congress... began a new era of environ-
mental regulation." Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The Congress authorizes and directs that
all agencies of the Federal Government shall .... [i]nclude in every recom-
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U.S. agency action affecting the environment at least to the ex-
tent of ensuring that the Act's procedural requirements were
met in the agency's decision making process.47
Because preparation of an EIS was a lengthy process, many
U.S. agencies sought to avoid the delay in the decision making
process by attacking the language of NEPA. 48 For instance, de-
fendant agencies questioned the meaning of "significantly" af-
fecting the environment 49 and "major" federal action.5 ° Addi-
tionally, the timing of EIS preparation was a point of contention
in litigation.5' NEPA contemplates early preparation of an EIS
to aid in the agency's decision making process 52 rather than serv-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) The relationship between the local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
47. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission, 449 F.2d '1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Judge Skelly Wright interpreting
NEPA).
48. Keith Bradsher, Court Ruling Lets Trade Agreement Move to Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1993, § 1, at I (indicating preparation of environmental impact statement may
be "yearlong" process).
49. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (describing secon-
dary effects as falling within meaning of significantly); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing Forest Service's finding of no significant impact on oil
and gas leases for National Forests); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972) (discussing significantly in urban context as having cumulative effect). A Finding
of No Significant Impact (FONSI) relieves the agency of its EIS obligation. See 40
C.F.R. § 1500.3 (discussing NEPA procedure).
50. See, e.g., Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394 (9th
Cir. 1989) (deferring to Corps interpretation as to whether issuance of wetland water
permit constitutes private action or federal action); Maryland Conservation Council,
Inc. v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1986) (declaring federally funded non-federal
highway project to be federal action); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) ("actions" include
rules, regulations, legislative proposals, treaties, etc.).
51. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). "[T]he moment at which an
agency must have a final statement ready 'is the time at which it makes a recommenda-
tion or report on a proposal for federal action.' " Id. at 406 (quoting Aberdeen & Rock-
fish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975)).
52. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406 n.15.
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ing as a post hoc rationalization for choices already made.53 The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that a court is
without authority to intervene and determine the point at which
a potential proposal becomes a proposal requiring an EIS.5 4
Otherwise, that court would be involved in the agency's day-to-
day decision making process. 55
In spite of its purely procedural requirements, 56 NEPA
nonetheless provides environmental litigants with a powerful
tool for influencing U.S. federal policy.57 If those procedural re-
53. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion ofJustice Marshall citing Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971)).
54. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406.
55. Id. The Court indicated that "[s]uch an assertion of judicial authority would
... invite judicial involvement in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the agen-
cies." Id. However, the Court cautioned that
[t]his is not to say that § 102(2) (C) imposes no duties upon an agency prior to
its making a report or recommendation on a proposal for action .... [T]he
section contemplates a consideration of environmental factors by agencies
during the evolution of a report or recommendation on a proposal. But the
time at which a court enters the process is when the report or recommenda-
tion on the proposal is made, and someone protests either the absence or the
adequacy of the final impact statement. This is the point at which an agency's
action has reached sufficient maturity to assure that judicial intervention will
not hazard unnecessary disruption.
Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406 n.15.
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's requirements); see
also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). The Court
stated:
NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the nec-
essary process .... If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed ac-
tion are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by
NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs ....
Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on federal
agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed - rather than unwise -
agency action.
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlan,
444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)); see also Sierra Club v. Marsh,
872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1985). The court declared:
NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it fore-
sees that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good
reasons. Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process;
its aim is to make government officials notice environmental considerations
and take them into account. Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obliga-
tions attach is made without the informed environmental consideration that
NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered.
Marsh, 872 F.2d at 500.
57. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1985) (where environmen-
talists' in their action to stop highway project lacking an EIS).
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quirements are not met, a qualified litigant may bring an action
to enjoin implementation of an agency plan.58 Not only does
such an action delay any harmful environmental effects of a fed-
eral plan, it also subjects the plan to public scrutiny.59
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
NEPA requires U.S. federal agencies to include an EIS with
each report or recommendation on proposed law and other ma-
jor federal actions significantly affecting the environment.60 Yet,
in drafting NEPA, the U.S. Congress did not provide a private
right of action.6" Therefore, members of a private environmen-
tal citizens' group must look to the provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (the "APA")6 2 when seeking judicial review of
agency action.6"
Section 701 of the APA permitsjudicial review of action by a
U.S. governmental authority except where a statute prohibits re-
view or where the action is committed to agency discretion by
law.' In the absence of such an exception, the APA provides
any person, adversely affected by agency action, with the right to
seek judicial review of that action.65 "Agency action" may be in
the form of a rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act on the part of the
agency. 66 The APA limits judicial review, however, to agency ac-
58. Id.
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (discussing public comment and review period re-
quired for draft EIS).
60. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). An EIS is to be included "in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment." Id; see supra notes 41-59 and accompanying
text (discussing NEPA); see also Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 879
(1990) (discussing the requirements of NEPA).
61. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882; Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d
at 551 (discussing absence of private right of action under NEPA).
62. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
63. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882-83.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 701. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971) (discussing judicial review under APA).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 702. "A person ... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Id.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Agency action is defined as "the whole or a part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or fail-
ure to act." Id; see 5 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (2).
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tion that is "final."67 Identifying and defining "final agency ac-
tion" causes much confusion in the federal courts and remains
the subject of considerable debate in recent cases. 68
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,69 the U.S. Supreme
Court analyzed the meaning of "final agency action" in the con-
text of a challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's 70 "land
withdrawal review program."71  The National Wildlife Federa-
tion's 72 complaint, in Lujan, alleged that reclassification of cer-
tain lands by the Bureau of Land Management would open
those lands to mining activities and destroy their natural
beauty.73 The Supreme Court held that the National Wildlife
Federation failed to identify a single Bureau of Land Manage-
ment order but instead focused on the agency's on-going opera-
tions.74 The Court concluded that such operations could not be
construed as agency action, much less a final agency action.75
The Court explained that it was improper for the National Wild-
life Federation to seek programmatic change through the court
system, rather than through the legislative process, and declined
to apply the APA.76 To grant jurisdiction, the Court required a
67. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Judicial review of agency action is limited to "final agency ac-
tion for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." Id.
68. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (interpret-
ing "final agency action"); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1990) (analyzing "final agency action"); Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ap-
plying Franklin standard).
69. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 1731 et seq. The Bureau is located within the Department of the
Interior and manages federal lands and their resources. Id.
71. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 875.
72. Id. The National Wildlife Federation is the plaintiff environmental organiza-
tion in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.
73. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 886. The land at issue involved
pristine federal lands "in the vicinity" of the Grand Canyon National Park, the Kaibab
National Forest, the Kanab Plateau and the South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming -
each known for its recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment and now threatened by
mining claims and oil and gas leasing. Id.
74. Id. at 890. The NWF did not "refer to a single BLM order or regulation ....
[but instead] referred to the continuing.., operations of the BLM .... [which were] no
more an identifiable 'agency action' - much less a 'final agency action.'" Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 891-93. The Court stated that:
"respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court de-
cree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress,
where programmatic improvements are normally made .... [and] that the
flaws in the entire 'program' ... cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale
correction under the APA."
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specific, final agency action that actually had or immediately
threatened an adverse effect on the litigant prior to judicial in-
tervention under the APA. 7 7
The U.S. Supreme Court further refined its definition of "fi-
nal agency action" in Franklin v. Massachusetts.78 In Franklin, the
state of Massachusetts challenged the U.S. Secretary of Com-
merce's decision to allocate overseas federal employees - in
particular military personnel - to their "home of record"79 in
calculating the 1990 census and reapportionment.8 ° As a result
of the Secretary's method of allocating overseas federal employ-
ees, Massachusetts lost a seat in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives.8" Addressing the APA claim, the Court in Franklin rea-
soned that the central issue was whether the agency's decision
making process was complete and if so, whether the result of
that process would have a direct effect on the litigants.82 The
Court held that there was no final agency action reviewable
under the APA since the final action complained of was that of
the President of the United States, who was deemed not to be an
agency for purposes of the statute.83
In Franklin, the Court noted that while the Secretary of
Commerce is responsible for the tabulation of the census report,
the President submits the document to Congress.84 The Court
declared that the action directly affecting reapportionment was
the President's statement to Congress, not the Secretary's report
Id.
77. Id. at 894.
78. - U.S. - ,112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
79. Id. at 2771. " 'Home of record' is the State declared by the person upon entry
into military service, and determines where he or she will be moved after military ser-
vice is complete .... Legal residence was thought less accurate because the choice of
legal residence may have been affected by state taxation." Id. at 2771-72.
80. Id. at 2770.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2773. The Court stated that '[tihe core question is whether the agency
has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one
that will directly affect the parties." Id.
83. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773. The Court held that 'the final action complained
of is that of the President, and the President is not an agency within the meaning of the
Act. Accordingly, there is no final agency action that may be reviewed under the APA
standards." Id. This part of the opinion represents a five-to-four majority of the Court.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, Kennedy and
Souter, found the President's actions ministerial and thus, "final agency action" was
present for purposes of judicial review under the APA. Id. at 2779-83.
84. Id. at 2771.
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to the President.85 Thus, since the President of the United
States had the discretion to amend the report, the Court viewed
it as a "moving target" and equated the agency's action to that of
a "subordinate official" ruling - "tentative," not final, and
therefore, not subject to judicial review under the APA.86
In sum, "final agency action" under the APA requires a spe-
cific, final act8 7 in the decision making process and a "direct ef-
fect" on the litigant by that act.88 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the President of the United States is not an
agency within the meaning of the APA, and thus, U.S. courts
may not impute the acts of the President to an agency for pur-
poses of finality.89 A private litigant who fails to meet the re-
quirements of the APA, therefore, is without a remedy due to the
court's lack of jurisdiction.90
B. Justiciability Doctrines Implicated in the Public Citizen Litigation
Once APA jurisdiction is established, a litigant must also
overcome the additional barrier to adjudication posed by the jus-
ticiability doctrines born of the "case" and "controversy" require-
ment of the U.S. Constitution.9' Of the justiciability doctrines,
the doctrine of standing is perhaps the most considerable im-
pediment to environmental litigation.92 The history of the U.S.
Supreme Court's pronouncements on standing have been de-
scribed as inconsistent.9" For this reason, the standing doctrine
85. Id. at 2773.
86. Id. at 2773-74. The Court proclaimed:
An agency action is not final if it is only "the ruling of a subordinate official,"
or "tentative" . . . . For potential litigants, therefore, the "decennial census"
still presents a moving target, even after the Secretary reports to the President
.... It is not until the President submits the information to Congress that the
target stops moving .... [TIhe Secretary's report.., is, like "the ruling of a
subordinate official," . . . not final and therefore not subject to review.
Id. (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967)).
87. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 894.
88. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773.
89. See id. at 2775 (interpreting APA's silence as to exclusion of President under
APA definition of "agency" as insufficient to subject President to statute's provisions).
90. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (dismissing
environmentalists' complaint for lack of final agency action).
91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
92. See Hays, supra note 1 (discussing history of environmental standing and future
implications of decision in Lujan).
93. Id.
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has generated considerable literature. 4
1. Standing Doctrine
The concept of standing stems from the "case" or "contro-
versy" jurisdictional requirements of the U.S. Constitution.95 Ar-
ticle III of the U.S. Constitution confines the adjudicatory power
of the federal courts to actual "cases" or "controversies. '96 The
doctrine of standing defines the notion of separation of powers
with respect to the judicial branch and protects the federal
courts from addressing questions properly left to the executive
and legislative branches of the U.S. government.97
Standing invokes both constitutional and prudential con-
cerns in the U.S. federal courts.98 The constitutional compo-
nent of the standing doctrine serves to ensure that the plaintiff
has a "direct stake" in the outcome of a case,99 thereby preserv-
ing the requisite adversarial context to sharpen the issues before
the court.100 The constitutional minimum of standing requires a
plaintiff to allege: (1) a legally cognizable injury; (2) caused by
the defendant's conduct; and (3) capable of judicial redres-
sability. 0 1
94. See id. (discussing history of environmental standing and future implications of
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation decision); Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "And Artide lII. 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (criticizing opinion
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) and advocating "bounty" as
remedy); Maria E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme Court's 'Hypo-
thetical'Barriers, 68 N.D. L. REv. 1 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of
standing); Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review after Lujan: Two
Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991) (criti-
cizing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation decision).
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
96. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
97. See id. The Court indicated:
[T]he 'case or controversy' requirement defines with respect to the Judicial
Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that require-
ment are "founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited -
role of the courts in a democratic society."
Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
98. Id. at 750-51.
99. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972).
100. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
101. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). "A plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief." Id.; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, __ U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
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The second component of the standing doctrine, pruden-
tial considerations, is primarily a function of judicial self-govern-
ance. 1 2 Notwithstanding a plaintiff's having met the constitu-
tional requirements, standing may be denied based on pruden-
tial concerns of the U.S. courts. 0 3 That is, a litigant may not:
(1) raise the legal rights of another; (2) complain of a genera-
lized grievance - common to all and better left to the coordi-
nate branches of government; or (3) assert a claim not within
the "zone of interests" protected by the law invoked. 0 4 This pru-
dential aspect of the standing doctrine has raised the debate as
to whether a congressional grant of "citizen suit" standing is con-
stitutional.10 5 Moreover, prudential principles have led to the
application of the "zone of interests" test'0 6 in cases where judi-
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -an invasion of a
legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "ac-
tual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ....
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Allen v. Wright 468 U.S.
737, 756 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508
(1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16 (1972)).
102. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
103. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The Court noted:
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's rais-
ing another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and
the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.
Id.
104. Id. However, with respect to representing the legal rights of another, an or-
ganization may assert a right of one of its members. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739 (1972) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963)). "It is clear that an
organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a proceed-
ing for judicial review." Id. To do so, the organization must meet certain criteria.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The
test requires that: (1) an individual member of the group have standing; (2) the inter-
est involved is germane to the group; and (3) the claim does not require the individ-
ual's participation. Id.
105. See Sunstein, supra note 94 (discussing denial of standing in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) and advocating "bounty" to circumvent problems
raised by doctrine).
106. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). The "zone of interests" test requires a plaintiff to allege injury-in-fact that is
within the zone of interest protected by the relevant statute. Id.
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cial review is predicated on the APAI°7 and serves as a further
limit on the court's capacity to adjudicate the case.108
The complexity of the standing doctrine and its frequent
application in the environmental forum has made it a considera-
ble barrier to litigation and subsequent relief.'0 9 Without having
met each of the above requirements, federal courts in the
United States will not hear the claims of environmental liti-
gants.11° The U.S. Supreme Court has been strict in applying
the doctrine."'
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,112 environmentalists chal-
lenged the U.S. Secretary of the Interior's promulgation of a
rule" 3 that indicated that section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973114 was inapplicable extraterritorially." 5 The Defend-
ers of Wildlife claimed that the absence of consultation on activi-
ties abroad, which were funded by the United States, increased
the extinction rate of endangered and threatened species." 6
The U.S. government defended on the grounds that plaintiffs
lacked standing."17
In considering whether the environmentalists were directly
affected, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on two affidavits from
members of the Defenders of Wildlife. 118 One expressed an in-
tent to return to Egypt to observe the habitat of the "endangered
[N]ile crocodile." 119 The other stated an intent to revisit Sri
Lanka to view the habitat of "endangered species such as the
Asian elephant and the leopard."' 20 Both indicated that ongo-
ing U.S. involvement in projects abroad in those countries hin-
107. 5 U.S.C. § 702; see supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text (discussing APA).
108. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
109. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)
(dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
113. See 50 C.F.R § 402.01 (1991) (reinterpreting § 7(a) (2) to require consultation
only for action taken in United States or on high seas) amending 43 Fed. Reg. 874
(1978) (obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in foreign nations).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
115. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2135.
116. Id. at 2137.
117. Id. at 2135.
118. Id. at 2138.
119. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
120. Id.
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dered their opportunity to observe the habitat of those endan-
gered species in the future.12' While recognizing that the claims
involved a cognizable interest, 12 2 the Court seized upon the fact
that neither had "current plans" to visit these places - only fu-
ture intentions - and as a result, both failed to identify "immi-
nent" injury.' 23
Furthermore, the Court identified two factors that raised
problems of redressability and causation. 1 4 First, the environ-
mentalists failed to join the U.S. agencies responsible for fund-
ing the projects in their action against the U.S. Secretary of the
Interior who promulgated the rule.125 Because it was uncertain
that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior had authority to bind the
U.S. agencies, the Court questioned whether the agencies, as
non-parties, would honor the legal determination. 126 Second,
the Defenders of Wildlife neglected to prove that elimination of
the U.S. funding, a small fraction of the total, would result in
suspension of the projects abroad or reduced harm to listed spe-
cies.' 27 The alleged harms stemmed from the activities of non-
U.S. nations, not from the Secretary's ruling, thus suggesting a
lack of causation.1 28 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the environmentalists were without standing. 12
9
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2137. The Court has declared injury to aesthetics and environmental
well-being cognizable. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
123. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. The Court proclaimed:
[T]he affiants' profession of an 'inten[t]' to return to the places they had vis-
ited before - where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the oppor-
tunity to observe animals of the endangered species - is simply not enough.
Such 'some day' intentions - without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be - do not support a
finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.
Id. The Court also rejected injury theories based on "ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus"
and "vocational nexus." Id. at 2139-40.
124. Id. at 2140-41.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2142.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court also rejected standing based on the "citizen-suit" provision of
the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), calling into question the constitutionality of a congres-
sional grant of standing and equating such actions with "generalized grievances." Id. at
2142-43; see Sunstein, supra note 94 (criticizing Lujan decision and equating some as-
pects of justiciability with the notion of substantive due process).
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2. Political Question Doctrine
In the landmark case Marbuiy v. Madison,' the U.S.
Supreme Court laid the foundation of the political question doc-
trine. 13 In analyzing whether the Court had jurisdiction to de-
cide a mandamus claim directing the U.S. Secretary of State to
deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the
peace, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that under the U.S.
Constitution, the President was charged with exercising certain
discretionary political powers that are unassailable outside the
political arena.1 3 2 At the same time, however, Justice Marshall
declared that it was the responsibility of the judiciary to interpret
the Constitution.13  The President of the United States had
signed William Marbury's commission and affixed the seal of the
United States, making the failure to deliver the commission a
violation of a right for which the law provided a remedy. 134
However, because the legislative act providing the Court with
original jurisdiction in mandamus actions was unconstitutional,
the Court did not have jurisdiction to effectuate a remedy."3 '
The political question doctrine emanates from the concept
130. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
131. Id. at 170 ("Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the Constitu-
tion and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this Court.") (emphasis
added). The Court also defined the role of the judiciary as that of interpreter of the
Constitution. Id. at 177. That role has been viewed both narrowly and expansively at
different times throughout history. Compare Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (identifying the President's power to terminate treaty as matter involving polit-
ical question) with Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[l]t is the responsi-
bility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."). Often, the
availability of judicial review may rest on how the issue is framed. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
132. Marbuiy, 5 U.S. at 165-66. Justice Marshall declared:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discre-
tion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to
his own conscience .... [W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the man-
ner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist,
no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect
the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the
decision of the executive is conclusive.
Id.
133. Id. at 177. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is." Id.
134. Id. at 167-68.
135. 1d. at 180.
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of separation of powers. 136 The doctrine recognizes a limit on
judicial adjudication of matters that arise in cases involving: (1)
a commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch of govern-
ment by the text of the Constitution; (2) a lack of judicial stan-
dards for resolving the issue; (3) the necessity for a nonjudicial
policy determination on the issue; (4) the impossibility of ajudi-
cial determination without showing disrespect to a coordinate
branch of government; (5) the need for finality of a past political
decision; and (6) the need for unanimity among the coordinate
branches of government on certain matters.13 7 Commentators
have synthesized this statement of the political question doctrine
into two components, including the lack ofjudicial standards for
resolving the issue and the need for finality with respect to a past
political decision.13
However, not every matter touching on politics involves a
political question.1 3 9 International affairs, for example, is an
area traditionally left to the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the U.S. government. 4 ° Nonetheless, the U.S.
136. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (Brennan,J.)("[I]t is the relationship
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not
the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political ques-
tion.' "). Id.
137. Id. at 217. Justice Brennan noted:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unu-
sual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question."
Id.
138. See, e.g., Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the
Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 215 (1985) (arguing that political question doc-
trine assumes constitutionality, is adjudication on merits, not justiciability, and that
such an assumption is warranted only where there is need for finality).
139. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Compare C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948) (holding Presidential approval of agency decision regarding foreign air
routes equivalent of final order and not subject to review in courts by virtue of political
question doctrine) with Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (challenge by few Members of Congress to President's action terminating
treaty thereby depriving them of their Constitutional role not "ripe" without official
action by Congress).
140. See Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd on appeal, 411
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Supreme Court has stated that a case or controversy that merely
"touches" international relations may be justiciable. 4'
In Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 142
the Court considered whether the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
was required to certify that Japan's whaling practices "diminish
the effectiveness" of the International Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling (the "ICRW"). 43 Japan's annual harvest ex-
ceeded established quotas. 1 4 4 While the ICRW- set harvest lim-
its, 145 the implementing organization, the International Whaling
Commission (the "IWC"), was without power to impose sanc-
tions for quota violations. 146 As a result, the U.S. Congress
passed the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act
of 1967.147 The Pelly Amendment directed the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce to certify to the President of the United States if for-
eign fishing operations "diminish the effectiveness" of an inter-
national fishery conservation program. 141 Upon certification,
the President had the discretionary power to impose sanc-
tions.149 When the President failed to impose sanctions on five
separate occasions of such certification,' 50 Congress passed the
Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act.' The Packwood Amendment made
sanctions mandatory upon certification. 152
In 1981, the IWC set a zero quota for sperm whales andJa-
U.S. 911 (1973)(quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
"The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitu-
tion to the executive and legislative - 'the political' - departments of the govern-
ment, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 696.
141. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986).
It is "error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance." Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1969)).
142. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
143. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW].
The United States was a founding member; Japan joined in 1951. Id.
144. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 223 (1986).
145. ICRW, supra note 143, art. I, 62 Stat. at 1717.
146. ICRW, supra note 143, art. IX, 62 Stat. at 1720.
147. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
148. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1).
149. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4).
150. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 225 (1986).
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-82 (1988).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (2) (B).
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pan objected.1 53 After extensive negotiations, the United States
and Japan reached an executive agreement limiting, but not
eliminating harvests until 1988.154 That agreement, the U.S. Sec-
retary of Commerce deemed, would not "diminish the effective-
ness" of ICRW. 155 Environmentalists filed suit seeking a writ of
mandamus compelling the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to cer-
tify Japan.15 6
Japan Whaling Association, intervenors, claimed the issue
was not justiciable by invoking the political question doctrine.1 57
The Court disagreed quoting the language of Baker v. Carr which
stated that not every case involving international affairs is be-
yond judicial determination. 58 Justice Byron White added that
the Court need only interpret the statute in this instance."' The
Court went on to decide the case on the merits.160
3. Mootness Doctrine
Similar to the doctrines of standing and political question,
the doctrine of mootness is rooted in the "case or controversy"
clause of the U.S. Constitution. 6' While standing requires ad-
versity between the parties at the outset of the litigation, moot-
ness necessitates that the adversity be maintained throughout
the course of the action.' 62 If the controversy between the liti-
gants terminates prior to the court's decision, the case will be
153. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 227.
154. Id. at 227-28.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 228.
157. Id. at 229.
158. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 229-30. The Court recognized that "it is 'error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance.' [U]nder the Constitution, one of theJudiciary's characteristic roles is
to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our deci-
sion may have significant political overtones." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 231-41. The Court held that the U.S. Secretary of Commerce's con-
struction of the statute, vesting in him the discretion to determine the meaning of "di-
minish the effectiveness," neither contradicted legislative history nor frustrated congres-
sional intent. Id. at 240.
161. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
162. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1384 (1973) (Mootness is "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness).").
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dismissed. 163
Confusion in the mootness doctrine arises more often in
the context of the doctrine's exceptions. The first exception is
voluntary cessation of illegal activity. 64 Because the defendant
may again commence the illegal activity at some time in the fu-
ture, the dispute before the court is not moot. 65 In addition,
the public has an interest in the outcome of a case which chal-
lenges the legality of an activity. 66 Such a dispute is justiciable
because the public is entitled to have the legality of an activity
determined by the court for purposes of notice and predictabil-
ity of the criminal law. 167
The second exception to the mootness doctrine involves
controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review."168
Where mootness results from the passage of time, but the same
issue is likely to arise in the future, the court will nevertheless
decide the matter for purposes of efficiency. 169 The exception
requires a "demonstrated probability" or a "reasonable expecta-
tion" that the same issue will recur.170
Mootness is important with respect to NEPA actions because
the point at which a court may intervene to declare an agency
deficient in meeting the procedural mandate of NEPA is usually
after the decision is made. 171 At times, the court may still fash-
ion a remedy by enjoining implementation of the action at issue
in a case.1 72 At other times, such a remedy is not enough to
undo the harm that NEPA seeks to avoid.1 71
163. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1982).
164. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
165. Id. at 632.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911).
169. Id.
170. Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482.
171. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing timing of NEPA).
172. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989) (granting injunctive
relief against proposed development).
173. Id. The court stated:
NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it fore-
sees that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good
reasons. Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process;
its aim is to make government officials notice environmental considerations
and take them into account. Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obliga-
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C. Treaties Implicated in the Public Citizen Litigation
Recently, these statutory and judicial jurisdictional obstacles
were pivotal in U.S. environmental litigants' attempt to link
trade and environmental concerns. 174 By invoking these doc-
trines, the U.S. federal courts averted the difficult question of
judicial intrusion into the executive domain.175  The North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") were the targets of the environmentalists' chal-
lenge.1 76
1. The North American Free Trade Agreement
On September 25, 1990, President George Bush of the
United States notified Congress of his decision to pursue free
trade negotiations with Mexico. 177 Canadajoined in the negotia-
tions on February 5, 1991.178 Over the ensuing two years, the
three nations worked towards establishing a free trade zone
under the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA").179
NAFTA is a comprehensive plan to eliminate trade tariffs18 °
on goods originating"8 ' in the United States, Canada and Mex-
ico over a transition period.18 2 The agreement covers virtually
every aspect of trade among the three countries, including trade
in the automotive sector, textiles, energy, petrochemicals, and
agriculture.1 83 NAFTA also covers trade aspects of investment
and trade in services such as telecommunications and financial
tions attach is made without the informed environmental consideration that
NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered.
Id.
174. Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549
(D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Response of the Administration, supra note 17.
178. Id.
179. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 101, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
180. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 102(a), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
181. NAFTA, supra note 15, arts. 401-15, 32 I.L.M. at 349.
182. Description of NAFTA, supra note 15, at 5.
183. NAFMA, supra note 15, table of contents, 32 I.L.M. at 296 (listing items cov-
ered Under agreement).
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services.' 84
NAFTA aspires to expand world trade by building on the
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"),"' to enhance the competitiveness of the member na-
tions, to promote economic growth, to create new employment
opportunities, to improve working conditions and to undertake
each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmen-
tal protection and conservation.1 6 To accomplish this, NAFTA
establishes a free trade area.8 7 The Agreement aims to elimi-
nate trade barriers, promote fair competition, increase invest-
ment opportunities, provide protection of intellectual property
rights, establish procedures for implementation, administration
and dispute resolution, and establish a framework for further tri-
lateral cooperation within the free trade area.' 8 In furtherance
of these objectives, the three governments affirm their rights and
obligations under GATF. 189 In addition, the United States, Can-
ada and Mexico agree that NAFTA prevails over other agree-
ments in the event of an inconsistency. 90 Finally, NAFTA's obli-
gations extend to the state and provincial governments of the
three nations. 9'
While NAFTA was publicized as an historic opportunity, 92
U.S. environmentalists were not convinced of NAFTA's bene-
fits.193 Mexico's environmental statutes, although current, 94 his-
torically were not enforced by the Mexican government, leading
U.S. environmentalists to question Mexico's commitment to the
184. Id.
185. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT].
186. NAFrA, supra note 15, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 297.
187. NAFrA, supra note 15, art. 101, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
188. NAFIA, supra note 15, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
189. NAFrA, supra note 15, art. 103(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
190. NAFrA, supra note 15, art. 103(2), 32 I.L.M. at 297. The Agreement excepts
certain enumerated agreements. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 104, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
191. NAFiA, supra note 15, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. at 298. "The Pardes shall ensure
that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this
Agreement, including their observance... by state and provincial governments." Id.
192. Response of the Administration, supra note 17.
193. Id.
194. The Council on International Affairs, Report on the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 49 REc. ASS'N BAR Crry OF N.Y. 143, 223 (1994) [hereinafter Report on
NAFTA ].
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environment.195 Unless enforcement improved, environmental-
ists argued, the pollution problems common to the Maqui-
ladoras on the U.S.-Mexico border were likely to be visited upon
other areas of Mexico with the implementation of NAFTA.196
Furthermore, such a "pollution haven", environmentalists sug-
gested, would dilute existing U.S. environmental standards be-
cause U.S. firms would act to eliminate any competitive disadvan-
tage as against Mexican firms.1 97 Finally, the language of NAFTA
itself established the means for dilution of U.S. environmental
standards.1 98 Chapter Seven, for example, discussing sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, 199 established each Party's right to
protect human, animal or plant life.20 0 That right, however, is
limited to measures based on scientific principles that do not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between the Parties'
goods.2°1 Thus, since NAFIA disallowed such discrimination,
the possibility of an influx of Mexican imports below U.S. stan-
dards existed.20 2 By virtue of Article 105, NAFTA threatened
195. Id. The U.S. environmentalists labeled the Mexican commitment to the envi-
ronment "suspect". Response of the Administration, supra note 17.
196. Report on NAFTA, supra note 194, at 223. The Maquiladoras are firms operat-
ing just south of the U.S.-Mexico border that, under current law, receive favorable trade
treatment on goods shipped to the United States. Id. at 214. In exchange for this
favorable treatment, the Maquiladoras are to adhere to Mexican environmental laws
and, in the case of U.S. based firms, to ship their hazardous waste back to the United
States - obligations ignored in most instances. Id. The Maquiladora program has
resulted in significant pollution problems for the region. Id.
197. Id. at 223.
198. NAFTA, supra note 15, arts. 711-12, 32 I.L.M. at 377-78.
199. Report on NAFIA, supra note 194, at 217. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
"include measures to protect the public from additives, toxins or other contaminants in
foods and beverages, as well as measures to protect the public from pests and diseases
carried by various products." Id.
200. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 711, 32 I.L.M. at 377.
201. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 712, 32 I.L.M. at 377-78. The relevant language
states:
Each Party may ... adopt... any sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary
for the protection of human, animal or plant life [provided that the measure
is] based on scientific principles .... does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably dis-
criminate between its goods and like goods of another Party [and is not] a
disguised restriction on trade ....
Id.
202. Hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee: North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFFA) and Side Agreements, FED. NEWS Svc., Sept. 14, 1993. "U.S. quality stan-
dards should be met by any Mexican produce entering the country." Id.
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state environmental standards in the United States as well.2 °3
The Bush Administration countered these concerns by an-
nouncing that NAFTA would do nothing to weaken U.S. envi-
ronmental laws or diminish the right of the United States to pro-
tect the environment.20 4 The Bush Administration also empha-
sized the Mexican authorities' recent improvement in
enforcement of environmental laws.2 °5 Cooperation between
the United States and Mexico, the Bush Administration argued,
would serve to build the necessary resources for further improve-
ment in Mexico's enforcement of environmental laws.20 6 Finally,
in order to adequately address the environmentalists' concerns,
the United States, Canada and Mexico agreed to adopt a supple-
mental agreement on the environment in connection with
NAIFTA. 207
On August 12, 1992, negotiations on NAFTA were con-
cluded.20 8 President Bush officially notified the U.S. Congress of
his intention to sign NAFTA on September 18, 1992.209 NAFTA
was signed by U.S. President George Bush, Mexican President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney on December 17, 1992.210 On January 1, 1994, upon
the approval of the U.S. Congress and an exchange of written
notice between the United States, Canada and Mexico, NAFTA
203. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing state observance of
NAFTA provisions).
204. Response of the Administration, supra note 17.
205. Id.
206. Environment: The North American Free Trade Agreement, August 1992,
WESTLAW, NAFTA Database, PR Trade File, 1992 WL 239305. On February 25, 1992,
President Bush released the findings of a nine-month study of the environmental ef-
fects of NAFTA. Id. The study concluded that NAFTA would:
-Enhance environmental protection by providing Mexico with additional re-
sources to address current environmental problems; and
-Ease environmental pressures on the border as free trade encourages eco-
nomic development to occur further south.
Id.
207. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 18. The supplemental agreement
on the environment establishes the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, pro-
vides a mechanism for review of environmental disputes and outlines remedies includ-
ing a limited suspension of NAFTA tariff benefits. Id.
208. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Official Notification of Congress, Sept. 18, 1992, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA
Database, PR Trade File, 1992 WL 360153.
209. Id.
210. NAFTA, supra note 15, 32 I.L.M. at 703.
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entered into force. 211
2. The Uruguay Round of GATT
Since 1947, GATT has defined international trade. 212 GATT
was the seminal multilateral trade treaty.213 The goal of GATT is
to liberalize trade among its members or "Contracting Parties"
by eliminating protectionist measures.214 To achieve these goals,
GATT employs most-favored-nation treatment, national treat-
ment, progressive tariff reductions and limitations, or restric-
tions on, the use of trade distorting measures such as quotas.2 15
At present, the number of GATT members exceeds one
hundred.1 6 GATT is essentially composed of some 200 treaties
amending the original agreement.21 7 GATT's transformation is
the result of a series of trade rounds.218 Presently, GATT is in
the eighth round, also known as the Uruguay Round.1 9
The Uruguay Round has been described as the most com-
prehensive and ambitious round of negotiations in the history of
GATT .220 The issues addressed in the Uruguay Round of GATT
include agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, trade-
related investment measures, trade in services and trade-related
aspects of intellectual property, among others. 221 In addition,
the Uruguay Round of GATT establishes the World Trade Or-
211. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2203, 32 I.L.M. at 702. NAFIA passed in the
House of Representatives by a margin of 234-200 votes, while the Senate voted 61-38 in
favor of NAFTA. Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final Congressional Test, WASH. POST, Nov.
21, 1993, at Al.
212. GATT, supra note 185.
213. HARRY C. HAWKINS, G.A.T.T. AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 20 (1955). "Prior to GATT the method employed
... was the bilateral rather than the multilateral approach." Id.
214. Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy,
66 TEMP. L. REv. 751 (1993) (analyzing intersection of trade and environment in con-
text of U.S.-Mexico tuna-dolphin debate).
215. Id.
216. Matthew Schaefer, What's Needed for the GATT after the Uruguay Round?, 86 Am.
Soc'v INT'L L. PROc. 69 (1992).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Uruguay Round, supra note 16.
220. Sylvia Ostry, Europe 1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System, 22
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 311 (1990).
221. GATT SECRETARIAT, FINAL AcT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS § II-A1A-3, A-4, A-7, A1B, AIC (1993)
[hereinafter "FINAL ACT... URUGUAY ROUND"].
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ganization.22 In so doing, the Uruguay Round of GATT essen-
tially replaces the existing GATT structure.223
As with NAFTA, U.S. environmentalists feared that the Uru-
guay Round of GATT would result in a diminution of existing
U.S. environmental standards.224 The Uruguay Round of GATT,
like NAFTA, addresses, among other issues, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures. 2  Again, the language concerning
those matters suggests the possibility of a challenge to U.S. stan-
dards as barriers to trade.226 Thus, U.S. environmentalists, hav-
ing sought in the past to prevent any dilution of U.S. stan-
dards, 27 may again seek to prevent such harm from occurring
under the terms of the Uruguay Round of GATT. Such litiga-
tion was made possible on December 15, 1993, when GATT
members concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations and
signed the Uruguay Round of GATT.228
II. DISCUSSION OF THE PUBLIC CITIZEN CASES
During the drafting and negotiation stage of NAFTA,2 29
Public Citizen initiated suit to compel the OTR to prepare an
EIS under NEPA for the proposed legislation.23 ° In Public Citizen
v. Office of the United States Trade Representative ("Public Citizen
222. Id. § II.
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA and re-
lated environmental concerns).
225. FINAL AcT... URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 221, § II-A1A-4.
226. Id. The pertinent language states:
Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary
for the protection of human, animal and plant life or health, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement [are]
applied only to the extent necessary [are] based on scientific principles and...
sufficient scientific evidence [and] do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discrimi-
nate between Members ....
Id.
227. Public Citizen I, 970 F.2d at 917.
228. Peter Passell, The World Trade Agreement: US. and Europe Clear the Way for a
World Accord on Trade, Setting Aside Major Disputes; How Free Trade Prompts Growth: A Pri-
mer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al. Roger Cohen, The World Trade Agreement: The
Overview; GAT Talks End in Joy and Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at Dl. There is
nothing speculative about such a theory with GATT recently approved and heading for
Congress as "fast track" legislation. Passell, supra.
229. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing chronological
events of NAFTA).
230. Public Citizen , 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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/,), 231 the environmentalists' complaint was dismissed for lack of
final agency action as required under the APA.232 Because the
agreement was subject to change, agency action was not final. 33
Once a final draft of NAFTA was prepared, however, Public Citi-
zen reinstated the claim in Public Citizen v. Office of the United
States Trade Representative ("Public Citizen I/").234 Again, the ac-
tion was dismissed for lack of APA finality.23 5 This time, how-
ever, the absence of final agency action was based merely on cau-
sation. 36
A. The Decision in Public Citizen I
Although the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
were in agreement as to the dismissal of the environmentalists'
complaint in Public Citizen I, the two courts relied on different
doctrines.23 ' The district court found that Public Citizen lacked
standing.238 The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, did not reach
the standing issue.239 Instead, the D.C. Circuit held that Public
Citizen failed to identify final agency action reviewable by the
court.24 °
1. The Facts in Public Citizen I
In 1991, the United States, Canada and Mexico entered into
negotiations aimed at establishing a free trade zone within
North America.2 4  On August 1, 1991,242 Public Citizen brought
suit24 3 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief244 pursuant to
231. Id.
232. Public Citizen , 970 F.2d at 917.
233. Id. at 919.
234. 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
235. Public Citizen I, 5 F.3d at 550.
236. Id. at 551-52.
237. Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
238. Public Citizen 1, 782 F. Supp. at 140.
239. Public Citizen 1, 970 F.2d at 917.
240. Id.
241. See Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 22 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 32, 454-55 (July 16,
1991)); see also supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA).
242. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
243. Public Citizen , 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992).
244. Id. at 140.
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NEPA 45 requiring the OTR to prepare an EIS on NAFTA.246
Public Citizen claimed that the lack of information about the
proposed trade agreement inhibited their efforts to educate the
public and the U.S. Congress.147 Public Citizen asserted that be-
cause NAFTA was subject to "fast track" treatment,248 its claim
was ripe.249 Defendants argued that the environmental groups
lacked standing and that their claim was not ripe.25° On the
merits, the U.S. government's defense suggested that the "fast
track" statute preempted NEPA, that NEPA did not bind the
Trade Representative or the President of the United States be-
cause they are not agencies and that NEPA's application here
would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of pow-
ers.251 The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment while the de-
fendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment.2 52
2. The District Court's Decision in Public Citizen I
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in an
opinion by Judge June Green, held that plaintiffs did not have
245. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); see supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing NEPA).
246. Public Citizen 1, 782 F. Supp at 140. Plaintiffs sought the same relief with re-
spect to the Uruguay Round of GATr. Id. It is important to note that the remedy
sought is against the OTR and not the President. Id. "Plaintiffs' [sic] later withdrew
their request for an injunction against concluding the agreements, acknowledging that
such relief might intrude into the Executive's function." Id.
247. Id. at 141.
248. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-94, 2902-03 (1988). The "fast track" legislation calls for the
President and Congress to follow specific procedures to ensure the expedient consider-
ation of trade agreements. See Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 23.
Under the fast track process, the President submits the NAFrA to Congress
along with implementing legislation and an explanation of the changes in the
current law. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1) (B). The NAFTA must be approved by
both Houses of Congress before it can become effective, and such approval
occurs when the NAFTA's implementing legislation has been enacted by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1) ....
[O]nce the NAFTA has been submitted to Congress, Congress has only sixty
legislative days to approve or reject the agreement, id. § 2191 (c) and (e); legis-
lative debate is limited to 20 hours in each House, id. § 2191 (f) and (g); and
Congress may not change the implementing legislation or the Agreement. Id.
§ 2191(d).
Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 23. f
249. Public Citizen 1, 782 F. Supp. at 141.
250. Id.
251. Public Citizen I, 970 F.2d. at 918.
252. Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 141.
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standing to bring the suit at that time and granted defendants'
motion to dismiss.153 The district court's decision noted that the
APA governed judicial review,254 and relied heavily on Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation.2 5 In Lujan, plaintiffs challenged the
"land withdrawal review program" of the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management. 256 The U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs'
affiants, claiming that Bureau of Land Management decisions
caused harm to land use "in the vicinity", were not in fact injured
by specific "final agency action".257
Likewise, in Public Citizen I, the district court found inade-
quate the environmental organizations' injury, asserted deriva-
tively through its members. 5 8 Public Citizen's affidavits sug-
gested that possible challenges to U.S. environmental laws as
barriers to trade in violation of NAFTA would diminish state laws
protecting public health and the environment.259 The court de-
clared these averments imprecise and inadequate.260 Moreover,
Public Citizen's organizational interest in information failed to
point to identifiable agency action as the source of their in-
jury.261 For these reasons, the district court held that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing.26 2 The district court briefly mentioned a
ripeness problem as well, but elected not to rely on the issue for
its holding.263
3. The Court of Appeals Decision in Public Citizen I
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Stephan F. Williams, af-
firmed the district court decision.264 Unlike the district court,
however, the D.C. Circuit did not reach the issue of Public Citi-
253. Id. at 144.
254. Id. at 141.
255. 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation).
256. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 875.
257. Id. at 891-94.
258. Public Citizen , 782 F. Supp. at 142.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 143 (quoting Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
262. Public Citizen , 782 F. Supp. at 144.
263. Id. at 142 n.2.
264. Public Citizen , 970 F.2d at 917.
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zen's standing. 65 Instead, the D.C. Circuit held that the plain-
tiffs failed to identify any "final agency action" judicially review-
able within the meaning of the APA.2 66 The court's analysis em-
phasized that NAFTA was merely in the negotiation and drafting
stage and thus, did not qualify as final agency action. 67 The
court also noted that even though section 102(2) (C) of NEPA
contemplates consideration of environmental factors by agencies
prior to final report or recommendation on a proposal, the time
for judicial intervention is after the agency makes a final report
or recommendation on the proposal. 68 Accordingly, the OTR's
statement of refusal to prepare an EIS alone was insufficient for
purposes of finality.269 Thus, the court held that intervention
would be premature, would constitute judicial intrusion into the
daily decisionmaking process of the agencies and would result in
the preparation of numerous unnecessary EISs.Y
B. The Decision in Public Citizen II
Unlike Public Citizen I, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Public Citizen II differed as to the outcome of the
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 919.
268. Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976)); see supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial interpretation of agency's NEPA
duties).
269. Public Citizen L 970 F.2d at 921.
270. Id. at 919-20 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976)). The
Court of Appeals proceeded in Public Citizen I to distinguish two cases plaintiffs cited in
support of ripeness. Id. at 920-24. In the first case, Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), the court held ripe a suit to enjoin the Department of the
Interior from submitting a report to Congress until it complied with NEPA since it was
required to do so by statute - not true in the case of Public Citizen I. Id. at 920-21. In
the second case, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), the Court
reviewed an NRDC rule stating that the Commission would not prepare an EIS on per-
manent storage of nuclear wastes in individual licensing proceedings. Id. at 921-22.
The Court of Appeals in Public Citizen I distinguished the formal final rule from the
Trade Representative's statement of refusal. Id. In addition, Public Citizen's conten-
tions in favor of ripeness, that (1) only purely legal issues need be addressed and (2)
denial of immediate review would result in hardship on them on the theory that the
NEPA claim might become moot before it ripens due to the courts' refusal to enjoin
lawfully approved international agreements, were also rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Public Citizen I, 970 F.2d at 922-24.
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environmentalists' claim.2 7 1 The district court found that the
APA and justiciability jurisdictional requirements had been met
in Public Citizen's complaint.272 The district court ordered the
OTR to produce an EIS on the merits. 273
The D.C. Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's
order.274 The D.C. Circuit held that the OTR's actions with re-
spect to NAFTA did not directly affect Public Citizen. 275 Thus,
the environmentalists were not aggrieved by final agency ac-
tion.2 7 6
1. The Facts in Public Citizen II
On October 7, 1992, the trade representatives of the United
States, Canada and Mexico signed NAFTA. 77 Public Citizen
seized upon this event to bring a second action seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief compelling the OTR to prepare an EIS
on NAFTA prior to the agreement's submission to Congress.278
The U.S. government again defended contending that the court
lacked APAjurisdiction, that the plaintiffs were without standing
and that NEPA was not applicable to NAFTA.279 On cross mo-
tions for summary judgment,280 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, in an opinion by Judge Charles R. Richey,
granted Public Citizen's motion for summary judgment281 and
ordered the OTR to produce an EIS "forthwith."282
2. The District Court Decision in Public Citizen II
The district court began its discussion with an analysis of
APAjurisdiction.2 13 Distinguishing Public Citizen II from the ear-
lier action involving the same parties, the court found that
271. Public Citizen I1, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
272. Public Citizen I1, 822 F. Supp. at 30.
273. Id.
274. Public Citizen 11, 5 F.3d at 550.
275. Id. at 553.
276. Id.
277. Public Citizen 11, 822 F. Supp. 21, 22 (D.D.C. 1993).
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id.
282. Public Citizen 11, 822 F. Supp. at 31.
283. Id. at 23-24.
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NAFTA was no longer in "draft" form. 84 Instead, the agreement
had been finalized and signed. 85 MoreoverJudge Richey noted
that under the "fast track" procedure, 286 the agreement was not
subject to change once submitted to Congress.287
The court reasoned that although the responsibility for sub-
mitting the agreement to Congress rested with the President of
the United States, not the OTR,288 and the President is not an
"agency" within the meaning of the APA for purposes ofjurisdic-
tion,289 the OTR's actions were nonetheless "final" within the
meaning of section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA 9 ° First, the court noted
the substantial role that the OTR played in negotiating and
drafting NAFTA. 91 Pursuant to the U.S. Council for Environ-
mental Quality's 292 own regulations, a federal agency's signifi-
cant cooperation and support in the development of legislation
is all that is required for a NEPA proposal on legislation - in-
cluding treaties. 3
Second, the district court distinguished the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts.294 In Frank-
lin, plaintiffs challenged, under the APA, the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce's 1990 census report issued pursuant to a reappor-
284. Id.
285. Id. at 24.
286. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing "fast track" procedure).
287. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 24.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 24 (citing Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding no
APAjurisdiction to review actions by President)).
290. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp at 24. NEPA § 102(2) (C) requires that "all agen-
cies of the Federal Government shall .... [i] nclude in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
[tihe environmental impact of the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). See supra
note 46 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA requirements).
291. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 25.
292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing formation of CEQ).
293. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 25 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1992) ("[F]or
purposes of the NEPA, legislation: includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress
developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of a federal agency ....
The test for significant cooperation is whether the proposal is in fact predominately
that of the agency rather than another source .... Proposals for legislation include
requests for ratification of treaties.") The court also noted that NEPA established the
CEQ and thus, their regulations and interpretations of the statute were entitled to sub-
stantial deference. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 25.
294. - U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992); see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Franklin decision).
1148 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17:1115
tionment statute.295 The Court held that since the President of
the United States had the discretion to amend the census report
before its submission to Congress, it was a "moving target" and
thus, there was no "final agency action" reviewable under APA
standards that would "directly affect" the parties.29 6 By contrast,
the district court noted NAFTA was a "final product". 97
Third, the district court found that even though the Presi-
dent was not obligated to submit NAFTA to Congress, APAjuris-
dict'-n was not barred.2 98 The court pointed out that NEPA
unambiguously requires an EIS on ."proposals for legislation". 99
Therefore, APAjurisdiction was appropriate and an EIS was re-
quired on NAFTA. °°
The district court next considered the separation of powers
question raised in defense by the U.S. government.30' The court
found that an exercise of jurisdiction in this case would not in-
fringe upon the powers of the President to conduct interna-
tional affairs for two reasons. First, the power to regulate, com-
merce with other nations belongs to the U.S. Congress.3 °2 Sec-
ond, since NAFTA had been signed, all that remained was the
domestic issue of Congressional ratification .30  Thus, the court
felt the preparation of an EIS would not infringe on the Presi-
dent's international affairs power so as to violate the separation
of powers doctrine. °4
Addressing the issue of standing, the district court focused
primarily on the injury aspect of that doctrine. 0 5 The court
noted that denial of the procedural benefits of NEPA gave rise to
cognizable injury provided there was a reasonable risk that envi-
ronmental injury would occur.30 6 The court found that various
domestic health and environmental laws, including U.S. state
295. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773.
296. Id. at 2773-74.
297. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 26.
298. Id.
299. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)).
300. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 26.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3).
303. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 27.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 27-29; see supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing stand-
ing doctrine).
306. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 27.
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laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, contrary to NAFTA's free
trade provisions would be rendered inapplicable or would form
the basis of trade sanctions.3 °7 Moreover, harm to plaintiffs'
members living on the U.S.-Mexico border was sufficiently con-
crete as evidenced by the environmental problems then existing
in the limited free trade zone - the Maquiladora program.0 8
The court rejected the U.S. government's contention that the
environmental effects of NAFTA were "too widespread" and in-
sufficiently particular as plaintiff had suggested. 30 9 Thus, the
court found the plaintiffs' allegations of environmental harm
sufficiently concrete and concluded that standing was proper.
3 1 0
Finally, the district court determined that the "plain lan-
guage" of NEPA called for the OTR to prepare an EIS.311 A nar-
row exception to NEPA's requirement - a "clear and funda-
mental conflict of statutory authority" - did not apply in this
case. 31 2 Thus, the district court ordered the OTR to prepare the
EIS pursuant to NEPA "forthwith."313
3. The Court of Appeals Decision in Public Citizen H
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
an opinion by Chief Judge Mikva, reversed the district court's
decision to grant Public Citizen summaryjudgment 1 4 The D.C.
Circuit found the district court's distinction that NAFTA was a
307. Id. at 27-28 (quoting NAFTA Article 105 stating "countries must 'ensure that
all necessary measures are taken' to comply with the NAFTA, including compliance by
'state and provincial governments' "); see supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text
(discussing NAFTA).
308. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28; see supra note 196 and accompanying text
(discussing environmental problems associated with Maquiladoras).
309. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 688 (1973) (" [T] hat 'would mean that the most injurious and widespread Govern-
ment actions could be questioned by nobody.' ")).
310. Id. at 29.
311. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (1988) ("The NEPA requires that all fed-
eral agencies 'include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment' an environmental impact statement.")); see supra note 46 and accompanying
text (discussing NEPA's EIS requirement).
312. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic
Rivers Ass'n., 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976)).
313. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 31.
314. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.
Ct. 685 (1994).
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"final product" rather than a "moving target" unpersuasive. 31 5
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Mas-
sachusetts,3 16 the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the President of
the United States had the discretionary power to alter NAFTA
before submitting the agreement to Congress, or to withhold the
agreement altogether, thereby rendering the document tenta-
tive until such time as it was submitted." 7 The D.C. Circuit also
stressed that the President's discretionary power need not be ex-
ercised.318 It was enough that such power existed to show that
NAFTA was not "final" upon the OTR's submission to the Presi-
dent. 19 Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that in the absence of
Presidential action, NAFTA did not "directly affect" the environ-
mentalists.3"' Therefore, no "final" action by the OTR having an
adverse effect on Public Citizen was identified so as to subject
the OTR to judicial review under the APA.121
The D.C. Circuit also rejected arguments by Public Citizen
that the EIS was an "independent statutory obligation" for the
OTR and that application of Franklin in this case would effec-
tively nullify NEPA's EIS requirement where additional steps are
often necessary for environmental harm to result.322 Respond-
ing to Public Citizen's first argument, the D.C. Circuit stated that
absent identifiable substantive agency action, an agency's failure
to prepare an EIS alone is insufficient to trigger APA review.3 23
As for Public Citizen's second claim, Judge Mikva indicated that
the stringent "direct effect" requirement of Franklin did not rep-
resent the "death knell of the legislative EIS" since it was limited
315. Id. at 552; see supra notes 283-313 and accompanying text (discussing district
court's decision in Public Citizen I).
316. - U.S. -., 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992); see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Franklin decision). In Franklin, the Supreme Court announced the
standard for determining when agency action is final under the APA. Franklin, 112 S.
Ct. at 2773. "The core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmak-
ing process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the
parties." Id.
317. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 551-52.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 551-52.
322. Id. at 552.
323. Id. (citing Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)). "[A] n agency's failure to prepare an EIS, by itself is not sufficient to trigger
APA review in the absence of identifiable substantive agency action." Public Citizen II, 5
F.3d at 552.
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to cases where the President had responsibility for the final step
necessary for the agency action to directly affect the parties.324
In sum, the D.C. Circuit found that the "final agency action" di-
rectly affecting plaintiffs, Public Citizen, was the U.S. President's
discretionary act of submitting NAFrA to Congress. 2 5 Such an
act did not involve the OTR and was not "agency action" review-
able under the APA. 26 Public Citizen appealed the decision of
the D.C. Circuit and filed a petition for writ of certiorari.3 27 On
January 10, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari of
Public Citizen's claim. 28
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' NARROW INTERPRETATION
OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION IN PUBLIC CITIZEN II
THWARTS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WITH RESPECT
TO NEPA AND ESTABLISHES THE WRONG PRECEDENT
FOR FUTURE HARMONY BETWEEN TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Public Citizen II erred in its strict interpretation of "final agency
action".329 Dismissal for lack of "final agency action" was proper
in Public Citizen 1330 because the OTR had prepared only a
"draft" of NAIFTA.33' In Public Citizen II,332 however, the OTR's
involvement had terminated when the President "signed and re-
leased a final draft of NAFTA,'' 33 leaving only Congressional rat-
324. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 552. In the concurring opinion (Randolph, J.), the
court suggests that Franklin may in fact sound the death knell for the legislative EIS
expressing concern over the majority opinion's attempt to limit Franklin. Id. at 553. "If
one takes Franklin at its word, a legislative proposal's lack of any direct effects would
seem to mean that there can be no final action sufficient to permit judicial review
under the APA." Id. at 554.
325. Id. at 553.
326. Id.
327. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994).
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 314-26 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals
interpretation of final agency action in Public Citizen II).
330. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
331. Public Citizen 1, 970 F.2d at 919; see supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text
(discussing court of appeals decision in Public Citizen 1).
332. 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
333. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see supra notes 271-326 and
accompanying text (discussing decision in Public Citizen II).
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ification for approval of the treaty.334 Applying an unduly strict
causation standard, the D.C. Circuit failed to recognize final
agency action and thus, erred.3 35 As a result, the issues pertain-
ing to justiciability were not addressed by the court. Had the
D.C. Circuit passed on the issues of standing, political question
and mootness, Public Citizen's claim ought to have been ruled
justiciable, thereby allowing a decision on the merits.
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Finding a Lack of Final Agency
Action in Public Citizen II
The OTR's "implied" ruling that NAFTA was finalized for
the President, the equivalent of a recommendation on a propo-
sal for legislation, represented "final agency action" from which
environmental harm was likely to follow.33 6 The act of propos-
ing legislation sufficed to meet the final agency action require-
ment under section 704 of the APA.3 7 The duty to prepare an
EIS was thereby established,338 the absence of which resulted in
injury "directly affecting" Public Citizen.3 39 The NEPA action
was distinguishable from the decision in Franklin v. Massachu-
setts.3 40 The D.C. Circuit erred in not recognizing final agency
334. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional approval
requirement on NAFMA).
335. See supra notes 314-26 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals
decision in Public Citizen II).
336. See supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text (discussing APA "final agency
action").
337. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 554 (concurring opinion of RandolphJ., suggesting
possibility of such an interpretation).
338. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's EIS require-
ment).
339. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing final agency action
requirement under Franklin).
340. - U.S. - 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). Notwithstanding this reasoning, "Public
Citizen argues that applying Franklin in this case would effectively nullify NEPA's EIS
requirement because often 'some other step must be taken before' otherwise final
agency actions will result in environmental harm." Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549, 552-54
(D.C. Cir. 1993). This suggests the "death knell" for the legislative EIS. Id. The major-
ity disagreed limiting Franklin to subsequent action by the President. Id. The concur-
ring opinion suggests, however, that the legislative EIS may well be dead. Id. Note that
Franklin itself is limited by the doctrine of Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.,
478 U.S. 221 (1986), which renders agency action final where the President's subse-
quent action is mandated by statute. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2774. Nonetheless, the
suggestion that the legislative EIS is dead is an excellent rationale for accepting the
above reasoning rather than thwarting Congress' intent under NEPA.
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action in Public Citizen I.3 4 1
The first element necessary for APA review in the U.S. Court
of Appeals is a specific final agency act.342 Agency action is de-
fined as a "rule, order, license, sanction, relief; or the equivalent
or denial thereof, or the failure to act."3 43 Thus, even though
the OTR's involvement ended without formal agency action
once the President signed the final draft of NAFTA, 44 by impli-
cation, the OTR had entered a final "rule" as to what document
to submit to the President. This "implied" rule was the
"equivalent" of a formal agency action "rule" and satisfied the
definition of agency action. 45 Similarly, the agency's "failure to
act" or "denial" of such a ruling constituted sufficient agency ac-
tion as defined. 46
More importantly, agency action under section 702 of the
APA is qualified by the phrase "within the meaning of a relevant
statute. ". In Public Citizen II, the relevant statute, NEPA, man-
dates agency preparation of an EIS for a "recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation." 48 A "recommendation" is
not a specifically enumerated agency action, as that term is de-
fined, 49 but is U.S. agency action within the meaning of
NEPA. 5 ° Thus, when read together, the two statutes reduce the
formal agency action requirement from a "rule, order. . . " to a
mere "recommendation." Of course, the recommendation must
be final, but the final draft of NAFTA met this requirement3 5 1
341. See supra notes 314-26 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals
interpretation of final agency action in Public Citizen II).
342. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing final agency action
under Lujan v. National WiIdlife Federation).
343. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining "agency action" under
APA).
344. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (describing chronological
events of NAFTA).
345. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining "agency action" under
APA).
346. Id.
347. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (quoting section 702 of APA).
348. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's EIS require-
ment).
349. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining "agency action" under
APA).
350. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's EIS require-
ment).
351. See Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 26. "The NAFTA that was negotiated and
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The first part of the "final agency action" test was satisfied under
any of the above theories.
The second element necessary for APA review, having estab-
lished specific identifiable final agency action, is the "direct ef-
fect" on the litigant requirement under Franklin.35 2 This prong
of the test was satisfied by the procedural injury resulting from
the agency's failure to prepare an EIS.153 While the D.C. Circuit
in Public Citizen II refused to recognize such an injury without
identifiable substantive agency action,354 arguably, the "implied"
ruling or the "recommendation" was identifiable agency action,
and therefore, the injury was cognizable.
Here, the language of the court is instructive. A "refusal" to
prepare an EIS suggests no present duty exists. 55 A "failure" to
prepare an EIS in conjunction with a final agency act, on the
other hand, indicates an obligation not met and thus, injury.356
Once an identifiable final agency action exists and environmen-
tal harm is reasonably likely to follow, an EIS must be pro-
duced. 57 If not, procedural injury results having a "direct ef-
fect" on the litigant.35 8
In Public Citizen II, the OTR's final "recommendation" on a
proposal for legislation, NAFTA, represented final agency ac-
tion.359  Because NAFTA was likely to significantly affect the
quality of the environment,3 60 the OTR was obligated to prepare
signed by the Trade Representative is the same document that shall be submitted to
Congress .... " Id.
352. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing APA "final agency
action" requirement under Franklin).
353. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing procedural aspects of
NEPA); see also Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp at 26 (acknowledging procedural injury).
354. See Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 552 (citing Foundation on Economic Trends v.
Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
355. See Public Citizen 1, 970 F.2d at 918 (discussing "final agency action" require-
ment under APA).
356. See Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 552 (discussing "final agency action" under
APA).
357. See Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 24 (identifying final agency action with
respect to OTR's activities).
358. Id.; see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing "direct effect"
requirement of APA under Franklin).
359. See supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text (discussing "final agency action"
under APA).
360. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing environmental
concern over NAFTA).
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an EIS. 61 The OTR's failure to satisfy the procedural EIS re-
quirement of NEPA resulted in injury to Public Citizen. 62 This
procedural injury, a recommendation to the President and Con-
gress without consideration of environmental impact and alter-
natives, directly affected Public Citizen. 6' Not only was Public
Citizen's legal interest under NEPA unprotected and violated,
but the organization's ability to lobby Congress and disseminate
information to the public was severely hampered by the absence
of the EIS.314
"Final agency action" is the statutory equivalent of the con-
stitutional doctrine of ripeness."6 ' Although the Court has inter-
preted APA "statutory ripeness" more narrowly than its constitu-
tional counterpart,3 66 the purpose of the doctrine is merely to
prevent the courts from becoming involved in the day-to-day op-
erations of agencies3 67 and, in a NEPA case, to prevent the prep-
aration of an unnecessary EIS.3 68 However, where the U.S.
agency's involvement has terminated, as the OTR's has with re-
spect to NAFTA, and all that remains is Congressional ratifica-
tion,3 69 there is no such problem. The Council on Environmen-
tal Quality's interpretation of proposals for legislation includes
treaties and is entitled to deference.3 70 The D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Public Citizen II undermines the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality's authority and thwarts the intent of Congress by not
requiring an EIS on NAFTA. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit
sounds the "death knell" of the legislative EIS.371 The court's
approach in Public Citizen II is unduly strict.
361. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA require-
ments).
362. See supra note 56 (discussing harm NEPA seeks to prevent).
363. Id.
364. See Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 552 (recognizing harm in Public Citizen's inabil-
ity to lobby Congress and disseminate information to public).
365. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (compar-
ing APA finality with ripeness).
366. See, e.g., id. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing narrow jurisdiction) with
U.S. CONsr. art. III (providing broad jurisdiction).
367. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976).
368. Id.
369. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing chronological
events of NAFTA).
370. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (identifying CEQ's interpretation
of "treaty" as proposal for legislation).
371. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 554 (concurring opinion of Randolph, J.).
1156 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17:1115
B. The Court of Appeals Ought to Have Ruled the Issue in Public
Citizen II Justiciable
Even if the D.C. Circuit had properly identified "final
agency action" and asserted APA jurisdiction, the matter of jus-
ticiability remained undecided. However, Public Citizen met the
constitutional and prudential requirements of standing.,7 2
Moreover, Public Citizen's claim raised no political question,373
and Public Citizen's claim was not moot.3 74 Therefore, the D.C.
Circuit ought to have ruled the casejusticiable and proceeded to
the merits.
1. The Requirement of Standing was Satisfied
Public Citizen II satisfied the constitutional minimum of
standing.375 Public Citizen alleged injury, caused by the OTR's
conduct and redressable in the courts.37 6 In addition, Public Citi-
zen II satisfied the prudential component of the standing doc-
trine. 77 Thus, had the D.C. Circuit reached the issue, standing
ought not to have been denied.
First, as the district court correctly indicated, deprivation of
the procedural and informational benefits of NEPA's EIS repre-
sented cognizable injury provided there was a reasonable risk of
environmental harm.378 Public Citizen averred, with supporting
affidavits, that changes to U.S. federal and state laws due to
NAFTA's preemption clause would result in a loss of the health
and environmental protections those laws provide.179 Among
the standards affected were those for pesticides, chemicals, sea-
food imports and pollution controls.38 ° Moreover, NAFTA
posed a threat to environmental conditions along the U.S.-Mex-
372. See supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing standing doctrine).
373. See supra notes 130-60 and accompanying text (discussing political question
doctrine).
374. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doc-
trine).
375. See supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing standing doctrine).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Public Citizen I, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
379. Id.; see supra notes 283-313 and accompanying text (discussing district court
opinion in Public Citizen II).
380. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28 n.7; see supra notes 177-211 and accompany-
ing text (discussing NAFTA).
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ico border.38 1 The Maquiladora program, a limited free trade
zone presently operating in that geographical area, demon-
strated the severe environmental problems confronting the in-
habitants there 8.38  The present pollution problems were real
and suggested similar problems arising out of NAFTA were not
speculative. 8 3 Thus, Public Citizen's injury was "sufficiently con-
crete" for purposes of standing.3
84
Second, the D.C. Circuit was not confronted with a causa-
tion obstacle to the environmentalists' standing. 5 The proce-
dural injury was directly "traceable" to the OTR's failure to pro-
vide an EIS on NAFTA.3 86 Public Citizen should not have been
denied standing on this basis.
Third, no lack of redressability existed to divest Public Citi-
zen of standing.3 87 Although the environmentalists' remedy re-
quired the D.C. Circuit to order preparation of an EIS on
NAFTA by the OTR, such an order in no way interfered with the
U.S. President's power to proceed with the proposed legisla-
tion. Thus, the D.C. Circuit was not presented with a separa-
tion of powers conflict.38 9 Furthermore, the fact that NAFTA
was targeted as "fast-track" legislation,3 90 rendering completion
of an EIS prior to the U.S. Congress' vote on the legislation virtu-
ally impossible, did not preclude a meaningful decision. At that
time, Congress had not put NAFTA to a vote. 91 Speculation as
to when Congress would do so or as to the time required for the
EIS's preparation was inappropriate for consideration by the
381. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28.
382. Id.; see supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing environmental
problems associated with Maquiladoras).
383. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28. The government's own reports confirm
these apprehensions. Id.
384. Id. at 29.
385. See supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing standing doctrine).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing scope of relief sought
by Public Citizen).
389. See supra notes 130-60 and accompanying text (discussing political question
doctrine and distinguishing matters "touching" on politics from those involving polit-
ical question).
390. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing "fast-track" procedure).
391. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing chronological
events of NAF1A). Both houses of Congress have since voted and approved NAFTA
which entered into force on January 1, 1994. See Dewar, supra note 211 and accompa-
nying text (indicating Congressional approval of NAFTA).
1158 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17:1115
D.C. Circuit at the time of their decision. The only issue before
the court was whether the OTR had a duty to prepare an EIS on
NAFTA.392 In addition, the previous litigation, 93 brought with
the intention of providing the OTR with ample time to complete
an EIS, although dismissed, should have put the U.S. govern-
ment on notice of the EIS requirement and fairness would pre-
clude them from raising such a hardship claim.394 Finally, the
redressability concerns raised suggested a mootness problem in
the case. 95 However, an exception to the mootness doctrine for
controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review"396 was
particularly appropriate in Public Citizen's case. The same issue
was likely to arise with respect to the Uruguay Round of
GATT.3 97 Thus, under such an analysis, Public Citizen met the
standing doctrine's constitutional requirements of injury, causa-
tion and redressability.3 98
As for the prudential considerations of the standing doc-
trine,399 again Public Citizen II posed no problem for the D.C.
Circuit. First, the environmentalists' alleged injury in fact within
the "zone of interest" protected by the relevant U.S. statute.400
Public Citizen's alleged injuries to aesthetics and environmental
well-being were cognizable.401 Second, no third party standing
issue existed since Public Citizen met the test for organizational
standing.40 2 An organization whose members suffer injury is en-
titied to represent those members in an action for judicial re-
view.4°3 Finally, since the claims raised by Public Citizen's mem-
bers were particularized and reflected direct injury, a "genera-
lized grievance" assertion was improper. °4  Prudential
392. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 550.
393. See supra notes 237-70 and accompanying text (discussing Public Citizen 1).
394. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. 21, 30 n.15 (D.D.C. 1993).
395. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doc-
trine).
396. Id.
397. See supra notes 212-28 and accompanying text (discussing Uruguay Round of
GATT and possibility of new litigation).
398. See supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing standing doctrine).
399. Id.
400. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing "zone of interests" test).
401. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing cognizable injuries).
402. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing organizational stand-
ing).
403. Id.
404. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 28.
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considerations, therefore, do not divest Public Citizen of stand-
ing.
In sum, Public Citizen established facts sufficient to sur-
mount both the constitutional and prudential requirements for
standing.4 °5 The D.C. Circuit never reached this issue. 4 6 Had
the D.C. Circuit addressed the standing issue, the claim ought to
have been ruled justiciable.
2. No Political Question was Raised by the Claim
Having determined that the OTR's submission of NAFTA to
the President of the United States constituted "final agency ac-
tion" and that Public Citizen had standing, the D.C. Circuit
would then have been required to consider whether the transac-
tion involved a political question.40 7 A political question would
have involved either a lack ofjudicial standards for resolving the
issue or the need for finality with respect to a past political deci-
sion.408 Because the OTR is located "within the Executive Office
of the President,"4" a judicial determination on the merits
would represent a potential encroachment on a domain of U.S.
government committed to a coordinate branch - international
affairs.4 10 However, even if judicial restraint was warranted as to
the actions of the President or Congress, such restraint was not
due the OTR. Furthermore, because Public Citizen 11411 merely
"touched" international affairs, the question therein - whether
the OTR's proposal for legislation (NAFTA) required an EIS
under NEPA - was justiciable, not political.412
In Public Citizen II, although the issue "touched" interna-
tional affairs,413 the D.C. Circuit's decision merely required stat-
utory interpretation of NEPA with respect to NAFTA - action
405. See supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text (discussing standing doctrine).
406. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 550.
407. See supra notes 130-60 and accompanying text (discussing political question
doctrine).
408. Id.
409. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing OTR).
410. See supra notes 130-60 and accompanying text (discussing political question
doctrine).
411. 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
412. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (quoting Japan Whaling and Baker
and discussing possibility of judicial determination of matter related to international
affairs).
413. Id.
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within the traditional capacity of the judiciary.414 The question
as to whether NEPA required the OTR to prepare an EIS for
NAFTA, as a proposal for U.S. legislation, was purely a domestic
issue. 415 The court neither lacked the requisite standards for ad-
judication on the merits nor intruded upon the domain of the
U.S. executive.4 16 Relief was sought only against the OTR.4 17
Although the OTR was located "within the Executive Office of
the President,"418 the agency had responsibilities other than as-
sisting and advising the President and thus, was an agency sub-
ject to the APA.419 Furthermore, even though the President of
the United States had approved the final draft of NAFTA, no
formal statement had been made by the Executive as to whether
the OTR was required to prepare an EIS under NEPA.420 Thus,
there was no concern regarding the "finality" of a Presidential
pronouncement.41  If the President had formally approved of
the OTR's failure to prepare an EIS, then it would have been
incumbent upon the U.S. Congress to defend against the chal-
lenge to NEPA.4 22 In such a case, until Congress took such ac-
tion, the issue would not be "ripe."42 1 Instead, the OTR's re-
sponsibility was an "independent statutory obligation"4 24 and did
not involve the President.4 25 Thus, no political question
414. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (defining role of
U.S. judicial branch).
415. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 27.
416. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing requisite elements of
political question doctrine).
417. Public Citizen H, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.
Ct. 685 (1994).
418. Public Citizen I, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (1993) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a) (1988)).
419. Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. 21, 25 n.4 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
420. Cf C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (holding
Presidential approval of an agency decision regarding foreign air routes equivalent of
final order and not subject to review in courts by virtue of political question doctrine).
421. Id.
422. Cf Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979)(Powell, J., concur-
ring) (challenge by few Members of Congress to President's action terminating treaty
thereby depriving them of their Constitutional role not "ripe" without official action by
Congress).
423. Id.
424. Public Citizen I, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 114 S.
Ct. 685 (1994).
425. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing scope of relief sought
by Public Citizen). As noted earlier, Public Citizen was not seeking to prevent the Presi-
dent from submitting NAFrA to Congress. Id. Furthermore, the fact that the President
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presented itself on the facts before the D.C. Circuit in Public Citi-
zen H.
In sum, none of the factors outlined in the political ques-
tion doctrine were applicable in Public Citizen 11.426 The D.C. Cir-
cuit need only have interpreted the NEPA statute.42 7 There was
no question as to which branch of the U.S. government was
vested with that responsibility - it was thejudiciary. 428 The D.C.
Circuit was well equipped with the "standards" necessary for such
a determination. 429 Moreover, the OTR's independence from
the President removed any concern over the issue of "finality".430
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan indicated in Baker v.
Carr,4"' unless the issue before the court was "inextricable" from
the factors of the political question doctrine, the court ought to
proceed. 2 And, as Chief Justice John Marshall declared in Mar-
bury v. Madison,4 33 it is the duty of the court "to say what the law
is."434
3. Mootness did not Prevent a Meaningful Decision
The mootness doctrine was the final area ofjusticiability the
D.C. Circuit ought to have considered.43 5 Mootness requires
that the adversity between the parties continue throughout the
litigation. 43 6 Because Public Citizen sought to compel produc-
tion of an EIS on NAFTA by the OTR for the purpose of lobby-
ing Congress 43 7 and because Congress had yet to decide the fate
has done so, and that Congress has since approved NAFTA, is not a bar to this action
since the doctrine of mootness excepts those claims "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doctrine).
426. See supra note 137 and accompanying text' (discussing requisite elements of
political question doctrine).
427. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of stat-
ute "touching" on political matter).
428. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
429. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing requisite elements of
political question doctrine).
430. Id.
431. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
432. Id.
433. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
434. Id. at 177.
435. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doc-
trine).
436. Id.
437. Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 552.
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of NAFTA at the time of the D.C. Circuit's decision,438 the con-
troversy did not cease to exist but remained "live". 39 Specula-
tion as to the OTR's ability to complete an EIS prior to a U.S.
Congressional vote on NAFTA did not change this analysis. The
D.C. Circuit needed only to decide the OTR's duty at the time of
the court's decision.
However, the mootness doctrine was of greater import with
respect to Public Citizen's petition for writ of certiorari.440 At
the time the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on January
10, 1994, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S.
Senate had approved NAFTA and the agreement was in force as
of January 1, 1994.44 1 Thus, the OTR's production of an EIS
after January 1, 1994, served no purpose in assisting the U.S.
Congress in its decision on NAFTA.
Nevertheless, an exception to the mootness doctrine pro-
vided for the continuing vitality of the litigation.442 The issue in
Public Citizen II, whether the OTR was required to prepare an
EIS on certain treaties, was "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."443  The "demonstrated probability" of repetition cen-
tered on the passage of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the
likelihood of similar litigation. 444 Thus, even though the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari on Public Citizen II, 4 such ac-
tion was not required under the mootness doctrine. The U.S.
Supreme Court was not precluded from fulfilling its duty to "say
what the law is." 446
438. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing chronological
events of NAFI'A).
439. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doc-
trine).
440. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (noting Public Citizen's peti-
tion for certiorari).
441. See supra notes 177-211 and accompanying text (discussing chronological
events of NAFMA).
442. See supra note 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing mootness doctrine
and its exceptions).
443. Id.
444. Id.; see supra notes 212-28 and accompanying text (discussing Uruguay Round
of GAIT and possibility of new litigation).
445. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (noting denial of certiorari in
Public Citizen I).
446. Marbuyy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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CONCLUSION
In Public Citizen II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia erred in reading the APA meaning of "final agency
action" so narrowly.447 Congress intended the language to re-
quire "ripeness" not to provide a loophole for agencies to avoid
responsibility through their inaction. The D.C. Circuit ought to
have found "final agency action" in the OTR's completion of
NAFTA negotiations, subsequently ruling the matter justiciable
and proceeding to the merits of the case. If it is the intent of the
U.S. Congress to exempt the OTR, acting in its advisory role to
the President, from preparing an EIS pursuant to NEPA, then
that intention should be explicitly stated by the U.S. Congress. It
is not for the U.S. federal courts to do so artificially through the
doctrines of justiciability.
Paul N. Sheridan*
447. See supra notes 314-26 and accompanying text (discussing decision of court of
appeals in Public Citizen I).
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